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JPRS L/10462 15 April 1982

## East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 6/82)



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POLAND

CULTURAL FIGURE GIVES VIEWS ON SITUATION IN COUNTRY

PM301439 Paris PARIS MATCH in French 25 Dec 81 pp 25, 103

[Interview with Andrzej Zulawski, Polish poet, writer and movie director, by Jean-Francois Chaigneau: "'Jaruzelski Will Fire on the Crowd or Commit Suicide'"--in Paris, date unspecified]

[Text] Andrzej Zulawski: This time, that's it, the two trains have set off, and they are traveling in opposite directions....

PARIS MATCH: Which did you take?

Andrzej Zulawski: You can't really take the Communist Party and Army train: so I took Sclidarity's....

PARIS MATCH: Do you regret it?

Andrzej Zulawski: Yes indeed: Walesa's train has been derailed. It is a monumental error to have reached this point. Primarily I blame his lack of political sense. Everything should have been done to prevent this direct confrontation from arising.

PARIS MATCH: Are you thinking of civil war?

Andrzej Zulawski: The fundamental question is whether the Polish people are tired enough to capitulate or angry enough to continue. For my part I am sure that they are too tired—that the women are too tired to make war, too sick of seeing their children not have any milk...that physicians have had enough of hospitals filled with 3— or 4—year—old children suffering from malnutrition.... I hope that the population will think that the military coup is after all an honorable outcome, proving that courage is not at issue because the disproportion between the forces is too great.

PARIS MATCH: Do you want the Poles to capitulate?

Andrzej Zulawski: Yes, at this stage, but only in order to resume the struggle later, in the sphere of what seems possible to me.

PARIS MATCH: What is this sphere?

Andrzej Zulawski: First let me define what is not feasible: A general revolt by all the USSR's satellite countries? The revolts do not happen simultaneously (Budapest 1956, Prague 1968). The breakup of the Soviet Union into 100 nationalist republics? It is possible but certainly not tomorrow. World war? The cost is too high. So, what is there left? Well, the sphere of "what is feasible".... I have always thought that in the history of Polish resistance the example was set by the Church. Since 1944, the Church has been chipping away slowly and patiently and nobody can do anything to stop it. They could imprison Wyszynski and tear out his fingernails, or mistreat a priest who spoke freely in the pulpit...that had no effect. The Church continued to advance. We must do the same. This was all the easier in 1980 since the economic collapse of the Gierek regime made it possible to introduce a new positive factor: the obvious fact that there was no possible retreat. So that allowed an improvement in the economic system.

PARIS MATCH: In the immediate future will General Jaruzelski give orders to fire on the Poles?

Andrzej Zulawski: My reply is cynical: To fire on the Poles "a bit," I would say yes. "A lot"? I would say certainly not. All I know is that Jaruzelski and people like him have been trained in murder and destruction. He probably does not know himself where the line between "a bit" and "a lot" lies. In my opinion, he will soon be faced with a Draconian alternative: either to give orders to fire on his own people or to blow his brains out.

PARIS MATCH: But he is a totally pro-Soviet general, after all.

Andrzej Zulawski: Yes, but that is one of the paradoxes of Poland. This communist general, pro-Soviet and politicized in the extreme, is certainly in the final analysis a Polish nationalist, as we all are. Anyway, just before Saturday's events, he said this: "Poland is not dead as long as we live." He thus used the double language to which every Pole is accustomed. This simple phrase means: If I, a Pole, do not do it myself, someone else will. So I beg you, give in....

PARIS MATCH: And the Army?

Andrzej Zulawski: The Army is two-thirds composed of draftees. The remainder constitutes a caste of professionals. They are recognizable. They are big and fat and greasy-skinned. They have all the privileges offered by the regime: apartment, food, car and clothes.... They are people educated within the system; in defending it, they are defending themselves. They will obey and fire.

PARIS MATCH: For the West, Poland is the country which is causing trouble for the Soviet bloc.

Andrzej Zulawski: Yes. Unfortunately that is perfectly in keeping with the Polish spirit. For a long time now, especially since the 19th century,

Poland has had a sort of messianic dream. The Poles see themselves as a model, concentrated on their sufferings and misfortunes; and today they are convinced that they will prompt the start of the fall of the Soviet empire.

PARIS MATCH: It is understandable that the Poles are sick of communism.

Andrzej Zulawski: They never wanted it. They are a people who are 98 percent Catholic and who were handed by the West to the Soviet system. In 1945 Stalin drew the borders and that was that. Nothing paved the way for it, yet merely at bayonet-point the country became communist. At the time, 90 percent of the population had neither an outlook nor a political education leading to communism.... But everybody knows that. The problem was rather how to manage communism differently from the others.

PARIS MATCH: So the country cannot become free?

Andrzej Zulawski: It cannot become a democracy, either bourgeois, capitalist, liberal or anything else. It cannot change its regime. The country is a land of passage, an enormous plain crossed by the railroad tracks taking Soviet troops into East Germany. Ours is only a geopolitical role. Stalin himself granted us this favor. In fact, Stalinism was never as oppressive in our country as it was elsewhere.

PARIS MATCH: The explosion of Solidarity, is that the difference?

Andrzej Zulawski: It is more than that. It is quite simply the exasperation of a people who can no longer endure lies, poverty, lack of liberty and inefficiency. So the country explodes and loses its head.

PARIS MATCH: The detonator?

Andrzej Zulawski: The Pope accounts for 90 percent and sausages for 10 percent.

PARIS MATCH: ....

Andrzej Zulawski: Before John Paul II's election, there were long periods in Poland when the working class did nothing. Intellectuals and students were regularly beaten up but the working class did not care. At the same time, food began to be frighteningly scarce under Gierek's team. And then the Pope came. You have to be Polish to understand what it meant to see the Pope arrive, all in white, and get out of his white helicopter on his visit to Krakow, the old royal capital. The country then rediscovered language, and that was the real miracle: Somebody was speaking to it clearly. Poland got drunk on words and phrases and Walesa got nothing but promises.

PARIS MATCH: Yet Solidarity was legalized?

Andrzej Zulawski: Solidarity--what difference does that make if you can not eat to satisfy your hunger? Walesa is very wrongheaded. I do not want

to add to his burdens at this difficult time, but he is a man who has been puffed up by events though he is incapable of taking charge of them or understanding them. He is too simple.

PARIS MATCH: But he has held the powerful Communist Party in check.

Andrzej Zulawski: But look where we are now. A huge surge of hope has ended up in military dictatorship. Since 1795 the country has experienced continuous occupations and dismemberments. And World War II has never ended for it. It is painful to say, but I think that in the country's historical genes there is a skill in living under constraint, as well as a tendency to misfortune. But I would not like to find today that there is also a suicidal determinism.

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POLAND

FRENCH JOURNALIST COMMENTS ON MILITARY TAKE-OVER IN POLAND

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 6 Feb 82 p 34

[Article by K.S. Karol: "The General's Ruse"]

[Text] The argument is classic: "If you do not help me, others, who will be tougher, will succeed me." But the trap is too obvious.

"The month of February began badly in the streets of Gdansk," proclaims the official agency PAP, which then goes on to report, in a few sentences, a "deplorable demonstration by young people," and then to list the reprisal measures taken by the military regime against the region's population as a whole. If one believes this incoherent version, there were only 3,000 young people demonstrating in the streets of Gdansk last Saturday. Why, then, was it necessary to extend the curfew by 3 hours in an urban center with a population of 750,000, cut off telephone communications again, and forbid all private vehicle traffic?

The Warsaw officials claim that it was a matter of hitting hard on a preventive basis, in order to discourage any protest movement against the price hikes (300 percent on the average) just coming into force. This explanation is doubly fallacious: first of all because the Warsaw putschists are constantly hitting hard (the courts passed nearly 500 sentences during the last half of January), and secondly, because the workers' reaction against the amputation of their buying power could not, in Poland, be a 1-day affair.

"Not One Step Backward"

It is difficult, nevertheless, to understand the dynamic of the Gdansk demonstration and of those that are also said to have taken place in Silesia, Lodz and Wroclaw, because the military in power have proved to be great experts in the blocking of information. In principle, at the beginning of January, on the eve of the meeting of the NATO foreign-affairs ministers in Brussels, they abolished censorship for the Western press, believing that this gesture would be sufficient to appease the chancelleries of the West. But in practice, the situation of the journalists accredited to Warsaw has not changed. They do not have the right to leave the capital or to telephone to their editorial desks,

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and their accreditation is subject to renewal each month, which constitutes an additional means of pressure on those who might try to inform themselves "too much." The Western governments, even though there are reciprocity agreements with Poland in the matter of the press, have not even deigned to raise a protest against these restrictions.

Poland, of course, is too dependent on Western food aid to be able to isolate itself totally. Those persons who go with the convoys of foodstuffs and medicines—into the "closed" provinces too—necessarily meet people and bring back news. Thus it emerges that Solidarity is now functioning clandestinely not only in Gdansk, Wroclaw and Katowice—its traditional strongholds—but also in the peripheral centers and in the countryside. Despite the "state of war," samizdat leaflets and even pamphlets have a broad circulation. Thus it was learned in Paris this week, with unusual speed, that the intellectuals interned in a relatively comfortable camp in the northwest of the country have sent to Lech Walesa a letter commending his tenacity and informing him that they will neither let themselves be corrupted by their privileged treatment nor separated from their worker comrades, who are the worst—treated of the prisoners of Jaruzelski's gulag.

Then, on 26 January, Walesa was in his turn served with an internment order dated 12 December, and managed to communicate his response: "Not one step backward. This partner has never been honest and never will be." After this message, the delegation of bishops, led by the primate of Poland, Jozef Glemp, that has just visited the Vatican, is fully aware of the fact that the Church cannot make the least concession as regards Solidarity without cutting itself off from its popular base.

The putschists reply that there is no longer any Solidarity in Poland. As the only people in charge, they are asking the Western governments for credits, and in order to overcome their reticence, are trying to get them to believe that a battle is in progress in the upper echelons in Warsaw: Jaruzelski and his police generals Milewski and Kiszczak are supposed to represent the "liberal" wing of the regime, anxious to carry out reforms and behave as in the time of "enlightened absolutism" (as it is put by the minister Ciosek). Pitted against these despotic "good guys" there is supposed to be a "tough" wing grouped around Albin Siwak and the weekly of the Grunwald police association, "Reality," supposedly determined to achieve 100-percent normalization of the country. In short, a Polish-style police war is supposed to be in progress, since on both sides the principal protagonists are in the security forces.

It is probable that the minister of foreign affairs, Jozef Czyrek, came to Claude Cheysson precisely to inform him of the "new development" in Polish politics. But the ruse is too old to be credible. In the East, anyone who holds power would like to have it believed that his possible successor would constitute the worst of calamities for the world. It suffices to recall that Gustav Husak too normalized his country while calling himself "liberal." But the case of Jaruzelski is even more serious than that of the Czechoslovak quisling.

In the interview granted to LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR last week, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt explains that because of their guilt complex, the Germans need to have

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with the Polish nation a relationship that is "morally clear, no matter what person is in power in that country, whether it is Gomulka, Gierek or now another communist, perhaps still another tomorrow, I don't know." I confess that this way of viewing the communists as a race apart, immutable and self-contained, leaves me perplexed; it flattens and empties of all its content the real history both of Poland and of its CP. In fact, Gomulka and Gierek were not only men with very different ideas and biographies; they also incarnated two very distinct phases of the evolution of "real socialism." The former was the promoter of the policy of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, with its promises of de-Stalinization. The latter represented the phase of Leonid Brezhnev's "technological and scientific revolution" and believed, as did he, that he could solve the problems by means of equipment imported from the West.

Sudden Changes of Pace

Jaruzelski, who arrives after the failure of these two attempts, is therefore not simply "another communist." He incarnates a different phase, and it is not by chance that he is the author of the first military coup d'etat in the history of the Soviet world. From Rome to Tokyo, the communists who know how to think refuse to consider this putschist dictator one of their comrades. After Enrico Berlinguer, the chairman of the Japanese CP, Kenji Miyamoto, proclaimed loug and clear that Jaruzelski struck his blow against the cause of socialism. Why must the chancellor of the FRG recognize a certain "communist" dignity in this Polish Pinochet, and why does our minister of external relations agree to receive his representative at the Quai d'Orsay?

The answer probably lies entirely in Francois Mitterrand's little phrase about "the delays of history." No one has any illusions about the nature of the Polish regime. But everyone believes that he has to live with it, because a lot of time is needed in order to change it or beat it. Maybe. But one should be on guard: since World War II, there has been more than one sudden change of pace in Polish history. Despite its limited sovereignty, this country is already in its sixth different regime, and the West would be making a serious mistake if it closed its eyes to its extraordinary fragility: this time, it is an entire people who, having found its political and social identity again, opposes the regime.

#### PHOTO CAPTION

General Jaruzelski receiving workers. Solidarity is now functioning clandestinely

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POLAND

FRENCH JOURNALIST'S INTERVIEW WITH INTERNEE NOTED

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 6 Feb 82 p 35

[Interview by Paul Baudry: "Three Weeks in One of Jaruzelski's Prisons"; date and place not given]

[Text] Few accounts have reached the West about what has been happening in the Polish jails for the last 2 months. Here, in an interview by Paul Baudry, is the account by a painter arrested on the same night as the coup d'etat, 13 December.

[Question] How were you arrested?

[Answer] The militiamen came to my studio on 13 December, at 1 a.m., and I found myself in an ice-cold cell, alone, without knowing anything about the coup or the reasons for my arrest. How could I have guessed them? I had indeed been militant in the 1970's, and after 1976 took part in the activities of the KOR\*, but since 1980 I had been quite simply one of the 10 million members of Solidarity, without exercising any particular responsibilities. It was only on Sunday evening, when I was given some cellmates, that I learned what had happened. Two days later, I was transferred to the prison of X..., where I remained until I was freed.

[Question] Always in a cell?

[Answer] No, in a big room, where there were some 30 of us: most of them workers, trade-union officials interned from the 13th, or militants arrested on the occasion of the first strikes. There were also two peasants of the rural Solidarity, some engineers, some students and myself, a painter. During my stay there, there was no right to have any walking exercise and no visiting rights; the broadcasts of Radio Warsaw were the only link with the outside. For the rest, we had relatively favored treatment: central heat, lighting until 9 pm, and we were brought something to eat at 7 am, 2 pm and 5 pm. The militiamen did roll call morning and evening, and whenever the door was opened one could see their stony faces in the corridor. On the other hand, the prison

<sup>\*</sup> Committee for the Defense of the Workers, founded in 1976.

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guards, who had counted on Solidarity to improve their miserable living conditions, gave evidence of their sympathy for us and went to the trouble of procuring for us, as much as they could, the things we asked them for.

[Question] How did you pass your time?

[Answer] We determined at the outset that in our prison there was neither any informer to spy on us nor any microphone for listening to us, so that we thereby evaded both the police system and the fear that it engenders. And a program of presentations was established: each morning and each afternoon, one of us would talk about his professional and political experience, and a debate followed, often impassioned.

[Question] What divided you?

[Answer] While the social movement that Solidarity constitutes is unanimous in contesting the dictatorship of the party, it is made up of different currents. The majority, who recognize themselves in Lech Walesa, have to deal, on their right, with the people of the KPN\*, and on their left, with the former leaders of the KOR. In the microcosm of our roomful of people, the KPN was represented by a nucleus of five persons, with a few sympathizers sometimes rallying to them, on the occasion of certain debates. The KOR was not represented as such, since it was dissolved into Solidarity; but we divided on the ideas of Kuron, for example—with the majority, incapable of imagining a communism that is not totalitarian, reproaching him for not having clearly broken with the Marxism of his youth.

[Question] What makes you classify the members of the KPN as being on the "right"?

[Answer] Their attachment to the past, to the country's military and insurrectional traditions, their nationalism.

[Question] Nationalism--antisemitism perhaps?

[Question] Quite so; we questioned them about that, but they evaded the question as if it were a taboo subject, one that gave them a bad conscience. The Communist Party has at least rendered one service to Poland: it has cultivated antisemitism so much on its own account that it has put it out of fashion.

[Question] In your debates, what pitted Solidarity against the KPN?

[Answer] The KPN reproached Solidarity with having been timorous and ineffective, with not having aimed at the government's vitals, with having mobilized the masses for combats lacking greatness. Solidarity explained that it had chosen to change the people and the structures patiently, that it preferred humble daily work to blows of heroic brilliance. It reproached the KPN with

<sup>\*</sup> Confederation for an Independent Poland.

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having furnished a pretext for the coup by revealing its long-term strategy, by declaring war on the Party and on the USSR.

Furthermore, life in prison revealed two attitudes: while the KPN people were plotting impossible escapes, the Solidarity officials, negotiating with the prison administration day after day, were improving our living conditions, thus expanding their influence.

[Question] Did you discuss the future also?

[Answer] We did nothing else! We talked, for example, about the oath of allegiance that a great many Poles have to sign on penalty of losing their profession or their liberty. Some were resolved not to make any compromise, even if they were to be sent to Siberia. The majority agreed that it was necessary to show realism and use stratagems against force, that the first imperative was to get work again, one's place, one's influence within society. At the time I was freed, I myself signed a commitment not to undertake anything against the so-called popular and Polish republic; but that doesn't bother me. But there are some more compromising formulas, and I know people who are not forgiving themselves for the disavowals extorted from them.

We also talked about the "passive resistance" spontaneously mounted by the population and consisting essentially in sabotaging its work. Some found it difficult to accept Solidarity's making a watchword of struggle out of this, and I have since learned that the Church shares this point of view. Should the cost of the downfall of the communist system be the total ruin of our country? Is it by reaching the depths of poverty that the Poles will be delivered from their tyrants?

[Question] Did you speak yourself about your profession of painter?

[Answer] Yes. I warned my companions against the temptation to engage artists in the liberation struggles, to turn the methods of "socialist realism" against "real socialism." A painter does not address himself to the masses, he speaks to persons. It is not by pitting some slogans against others that he has a chance of being useful; on the contrary, he will be useful if he helps individual people to exorcise the demons interiorized in 35 years of dictatorship, to kill the fanaticism inside them.

[Question] What weighed on you the most during your detention?

[Answer] Not knowing anything about the struggles in progress, not being able to take part in them. On 17 December, when Radio Warsaw announced the death of the Wujek miners, there was a moment of extreme tension. Since there was fighting outside, it was insupportable not to be fighting: we contemplated a revolt, a mass escape, at least a hunger strike. But a few Solidarity officials kept their cool and fought hand to hand against these projects inspired by impotent rage.

[Question] What was most valuable to you in this trial?

[Answer] First of all the solidarity, really lived. I told you about our impassioned discussions; I remember especially that they were conducted with tolerance and respect for one another, without violence or aggressiveness. And then the shared hope. It is only since I have been out of prison that I have met pessimistic people. Every day, friends assure me that we have returned to the Stalinist era, that we are in for it for 10 or 20 years. In Stalin's time there were convinced communists, coldly determined to sacrifice everything to their distant chimeras, but now we have only cynics, as preposterous as inquisitors who have lost the faith, short-sighted military men who have come out of their tanks without having planned any political scenario.

But that's enough about them! People are too concerned here about what they are doing; we were optimistic in prison because we always talked about what /we/ were going to do. We have changed since August 1980: through the struggles, the strikes, the liberty found again, we have woven new relationships among ourselves, we have learned to speak to one another, to love one another. That is mainly what makes me optimistic.

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